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Abstract 
 
We show that the dramatically increasing share of income going to top earners is consistent with the rise 
of the "power law economy" and argue this may reflect networks and increased digitization. Specifically, 
tax data (1960-2008) show an increasing dispersion of incomes in the portion of the distribution drawn 
from a power law, as opposed to the long-established log-normal distribution. We present a simple model 
arguing that the increased role of power laws is consistent with the growth of information technology, be-
cause digitization and networks facilitate winner-take-most markets. We generate four testable hypothe-
ses which are supported by the data. (1) Our model fits the data better than a purely lognormal distribu-
tion, (2) the increase in the variance of the log-normal portion of the distribution has slowed, consistent 
with slowing skill-biased technical change, (3) more individuals now select into the power law economy, 
(4) skewness has increased within that economy. 
Keywords: Income Inequality, Digital Economy, Information Economy, Network Effect, Power 
Laws, Digitization, Economic Impacts 
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Introduction 
In 1970, a person in the top 1% of the wage distribution earned between seven and eight times as much as 
someone in the bottom 90%. By 2008, this ratio had roughly tripled to about 22. While US has experienced 
a tremendous increase in income inequality over the past forty years, research on this phenomenon is at a 
critical crossroads. On one hand, the facts documenting the increase in US inequality are clear. On the other 
hand, there is not a consensus on the driving forces that caused it. Establishing the role of technology, if 
any, and specifically the ways that information technologies can affect the income distribution, is a key task 
for IS researchers. 
Most of the literature on the effects of information technologies and inequality has focused on skill-biased 
technical change, documenting and explaining a broad increase in the relative wages of skilled workers, 
such as college graduates, over unskilled workers. A less well studied phenomenon, which we focus on in 
this paper, is the potential of technology to create superstar effects. Digital technologies can amplify the 
ideas, talents or luck of a small handful of innovators, vastly increasing their income as they reach a broader 
market. In contrast to earlier production and distribution technologies, goods and services that are digitized 
can be replicated at nearly zero cost, with perfect fidelity and reach global audiences almost instantane-
ously. This fundamentally changes the way that value is distributed and allocated, and it would be surpris-
ing if it didn’t have significant effects on the income distribution. 
In this paper, we argue that the shape of the income distribution is changing in specific way: using nearly 
50 years of tax data from the United States Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and a new modelling approach, 
we show that a bigger share of individual incomes are drawn from a power law, or Pareto distribution, as 
opposed to the long-established log-normal distribution that historically governed incomes. We argue that 
the increased prevalence of Power Law distributions is consistent with the effects of the diffusion of Infor-
mation Technology, because digitization and networks facilitate winner-take-most markets. We present a 
simple theoretical model of income distribution and of the role of information technology, and estimate it 
using the IRS public use tax files. We find that more and more individuals seem to participate in winner-
take-most markets, and that, within these markets, competitiveness has been steadily increasing. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 highlights some of the relevant literature. 
Section 3 introduces simple models of the key economics of information technology and its potential to 
produce highly skewed income distributions, and specifically power laws. Our models imply four hypothe-
ses on the effects of IT the distribution of income and ways to empirically test them. Section 4 presents our 
basic tax data and shows evidence of fractal effects in income, which are consistent with the presence of 
power laws. Section 4 presents our empirical strategy and assesses our hypotheses more formally. Section 
5 offers some discussion of alternative stories, robustness checks and extensions. Section 6 concludes with 
a summary and some implications. 
Relevant Literature 
Recent Trends in Inequality 
This paper draws on three main spans of literature. First, it builds on recent research on income inequality 
and the role of technology. Second, it builds on the more specific span of the economics literature dedicated 
to understanding functional forms of the income distribution. Finally, it draws on recent research in statis-
tics and actuarial science for tools to estimate specific mixture models of statistical distributions. 
The recent increase in income inequality has been widely documented. Some of the most recent research 
started in France (Piketty 2001) and in the US (Piketty and Saez 2003), and was then extended to a large 
number of countries (Atkinson and Piketty 2010). The starting point of this literature is the Kuznets curve: 
the idea that inequality follows an inverted U-shape over time, in the sense that the industrial revolution 
brought about an increase in inequality which gradually reversed over time (Kuznets 1955). After forty more 
years of data, Piketty argues that the Kuznets curve has now turned up again: after decreasing around WW2, 
inequality has been increasing again in the United States since the 1980s. This phenomenon has accelerated 
in recent years: while the 1990s expansion led to a 10% increase of top 1% incomes and a 2.4% of bottom 
incomes, the more recent 2001-2007 expansion led to an 11% increase at the top and an increase under 1% 
at the bottom (Saez 2013). In other words, 75% of recent income growth went to the top 1%. 
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Why should anyone care about the income distribution? There are several types of arguments present in 
the literature: First, even if increased inequality is linked with a higher mean income, large groups of the 
population can be left significantly worse off. This has been the case for the median family between 1990 
and 2008 (Bernstein 2010). Second, increased inequality is associated with decreased mobility (Corak 
2013). This finding was coined by Krueger (2013) as the “Great Gatsby curve”, and may create concern that 
inequality can be self-perpetuating. Recent evidence shows that household mobility as become very low 
(Debacker et al. 2013). Third, increased economic inequality may lead to increased political inequality, lead-
ing to a vicious circle (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). Finally, a great deal of happiness seems to be de-
pendent of relative levels of income and wealth rather than absolute levels, and a dislike of inequality may 
directly enter into the utility function for many people.  
Theories of Inequality: Institutions vs Markets 
There is no general consensus regarding the driving forces behind inequality. A first class of arguments 
emphasizes the impact of institutions and historical events. Among the proponents of institutional expla-
nations, one can find arguments relating to recent drops in tax rates (Piketty and Saez 2003) favoring the 
rich, or to various types of rent-seeking (Bivens and Mishel 2013). It is also argued that past reductions in 
inequality were mostly accidental rather than the result of market forces. In this literature, emphasis is put 
on the effects of the two World Wars and on the great depression as the main driver of the large drop in 
inequality that was observed in the first half of the 20th century: a lot of wealth was destroyed, and wealthy 
individuals were disproportionately affected.  
A second class of arguments emphasizes markets and technology as drivers of inequality. These “market” 
arguments can roughly be decomposed into two main categories: skill-biased technical change and super-
stars. Skill biased technical change is the idea that new technologies emerge that have much higher com-
plementarities with skilled labor than unskilled labor, therefore increasing wages of skilled individuals and 
depressing the wages of others. SBTC is an important part of the labor economics literature focusing on the 
college premium. For a comprehensive review of this literature, see Katz and Autor (1999), Katz (2000), 
and Acemoglu and Autor (2012). It is worth noting that this literature typically focuses on the bottom 99%, 
i.e. tends to exclude top incomes from the analysis. Generally speaking, the bulk of the income distribution 
seems to follow a log-normal distribution. This seems to be the case over time, and in a large number of 
countries (Lopez and Serven 2006). 
On the other hand, the literature on superstars is concerned with a much smaller number of individuals: 
rather than investigating the difference between skilled and unskilled labor (two very large groups), it fo-
cuses on a very small of fraction of the population which receives very high incomes. While small in num-
bers, this group can command a large (and growing) share of aggregate income. The literature on superstars 
emphasizes the effects of technology through economies of scale that allows the most talented individuals 
to replicate their talent across larger and larger markets (Rosen 1981). The very top of the income distribu-
tion seems to follow a Pareto distribution rather than a lognormal one. Pareto distributions seem to be 
present in a very large array of phenomena: City Size, frequency of words in languages, casualties in wars, 
cotton prices, movie profits, publications and citations by researchers, social networks, internet links 
(Faloutsos et al. 1999), and many more. As analyzed in the literature on the “Long Tail”, sales of books and 
other products online can be very well described by a simple Pareto distribution (Brynjolfsson, Hu and 
Smith, 2003). For a list of documented phenomena following a Pareto distribution, see Andriani and 
McKelvey (2009).1  
Theory: Distributional Effects of Digitization 
The dominant explanation of income inequality has historically been skill-biased technical change: new 
technologies are used that require higher-skilled labor, thereby increasing wages of high-skill workers and 
                                                             
1 It is worth mentioning that more complex statistical distributions have also been used to describe incomes: Lognormal and Pareto 
distribution have recently been put together in the double Pareto Lognormal distribution, which is shown to fit income data very well 
(Hajargasht and Griffiths 2013). However, it is interpreted in terms of proportional random shocks applied to an exponentially grow-
ing population rather than in terms of individual productivity or markets (Reed and Jorgensen 2004). 
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depressing wages of lower-skilled workers. Autor et al. (2008) show an increase in both inter-group (ac-
cording to age, education and gender) and intra-group (residual) inequality. They document polarization, 
i.e. middle income workers being most negatively affected relative to those at the high and low end. They 
offer the explanation that computerization substitutes for routine information processing work more than 
non-routine cognitive work (at the high end) or non-routine manual work (at the low end). They also em-
phasize the importance of residual inequality: even within an industry and a job category, inequality is in-
creasing. In an earlier paper, Autor et al. (1998) show the influence of computerization on inequality 
through skill upgrading: the college premium increases faster in computer-intensive industries. Bresnahan 
et al. (2002) also show that greater use of information technology within a firm leads to the employment of 
higher educated workers and greater investments in training.  
However, these explanations focus on the “other 99%” (Autor 2014), and do not address the top 1%, which 
is a main cause of the increase in aggregate inequality. The chart below shows the evolution of the ratio of 
reported income of the top 1% of taxpayers to the bottom 90% of taxpayers. The increase since the 1980s is 
rather dramatic: where the average wage in the top 1% was roughly 10 times higher than the average wage 
in the bottom 90%, it is now over 20 times higher. This is evidence that understanding inequality likely 
requires paying special attention to the top 1% of wage earners. 
 
 
Figure 1: Ratio of average income reported by the top 1% to the bottom 90% 
   
Recent research has argued that some people are earning a disproportionate share of income because they 
have become much more productive. This seems to be the case for managers (Kaplan and Rauh 2013) and 
CEOs (Gabaix and Landier 2008). The link between increases in managerial productivity and information 
technology can be established using the concept of effective size (Kim and Brynjolfsson 2009). As compa-
nies become more IT-intensive, managers can control larger and larger spans of activity. A good manager 
can create a lot of value, and a bad manager can destroy a lot of it.  
Investigating the increase of top 1% incomes likely requires focusing on the properties of the digital revolu-
tion. The digital economy seems to have two main characteristics: first it is digital, allowing for production 
that is nearly free, perfect, and instantaneous. Digital goods can be replicated at almost zero marginal costs: 
For example, streaming music to two customers costs virtually the same as streaming to one customer only. 
Digital goods can be replicated perfectly, as the act of copying data does not degrade it. Further, goods can 
be delivered nearly instantaneously to anyone connected to the global internet. This alone can lead to large 
economies of scale and generate winner-take-most economies.  
Second, the digital economy is fundamentally networked. For example, when choosing a new instant mes-
saging app to use, or a new smartphone game to download, users may be influenced by the number of other 
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people already using these services. The more people use the platform, the more likely they will learn of it 
and, in many cases, the more valuable it becomes to any individual user. As a consequence, individuals tend 
to preferentially attach to services that already have a large user base. Or, they may primarily choose their 
new apps from the top-ranked apps from their favorite app store. Fleder and Hosanagar (2009) have shown 
that such recommender systems can create biases towards already popular products, creating a rich-get-
richer effect. 
How the Industrial Economy Generates Log-normal Income Distributions 
The main theory of the income-generating process that leads to a lognormal distribution posits that indi-
viduals receive a series of random shocks to their income (Gibrat 1931; Mincer 1958). Individual character-
istics seem to often be roughly normally distributed. This is the case for height, IQ, gripping strength, and 
many more. This motivates the question: “How can one reconcile the normal distribution of abilities with a 
sharply skewed distribution of incomes”? (Pigou 1932)  
Lognormal distributions are typically generated as the product of a large number of random variables. For 
example, assume that the productivity of a car mechanic is the product of a number of her individual abili-
ties, such as attention to detail, information gathering ability, skill in operating vehicles, decision making 
skill, ability to establish and maintain relationships, strength, fine motor skills, and so on. The higher the 
number of relevant characteristics, the more the distribution of productivity in the population will resemble 
a lognormal. This follows straightforwardly from the central limit theorem in log space: 
If 𝑋𝑋1, …𝑋𝑋𝑛𝑛 are i.i.d. individual abilities with positive finite mean and variance, and 𝑌𝑌 =Π𝑖𝑖=1..𝑛𝑛𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖1/𝑛𝑛, then log(𝑌𝑌) = 1
𝑛𝑛
∑ log (𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖)𝑖𝑖=1..𝑁𝑁 , and by the C.L.T, log(Y) converges to a normal (i.e. Y is lognormal). 
Two main implications follow: first, if a car mechanic becomes 25% stronger, his productivity will increase 
by 25%. But if he becomes both 25% stronger and has a 25% increase in fine motor skills, one can expect 
his productivity to increase by more than 50%. In other words, there are complementarities between indi-
vidual abilities, so that the overall productivity effect of having high abilities is higher than the sum of mar-
ginal productivity effects of these abilities taken individually. If compensation is equal to marginal produc-
tivity (i.e. if labor markets are competitive), then this process will create a log-normal distribution of in-
come. 
 Second, we can expect industrial technical change to alter the distribution of skills among workers: for 
example, the ability to write efficiently using word processing might have higher population variance than 
the ability to write with a pen. In other words, we might expect industrial technical change to affect the 
variance of income-producing skills within the lognormal economy, thereby increasing the variance of in-
come in the lognormal economy as a whole. Therefore, an increase in observed variance of the lognormal 
income distribution can be thought of as roughly capturing “industrial” technical change. 
How the Digital Economy Generates Power Laws 
Previous theories of Pareto distributions in labor income often rely on matching individuals with economic 
fundamentals that are already known to be Pareto distributed. For example, Gabaix and Landier (2008) 
match managers with firms, the size of which empirically follows a Pareto distribution. This can generate 
Pareto distributions for managerial compensation as well. A key takeaway from this literature is that infin-
itesimal differences in individual ability may result in very large differences in pay. This often results from 
matching processes between individuals and jobs that have higher and higher stakes, creating winner-take-
most job markets.  
We argue that digitization and networks can generate a Pareto distribution of income more directly. Let us 
go back to the example of competing messaging apps. Let us assume there are K apps, which all start out 
with 𝑁𝑁0 users each. At each time t, L new users arrive and face the choice of which app to use. If there are 
network effects (i.e. if an app is more valuable when it has more users), then each new user will tend to 
choose apps that already boast a large user base. For simplicity, let us assume that a new user’s probability 
of choosing app i is simply app i’s share of total users.  
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𝑃𝑃(“𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑢 𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑢 𝑖𝑖”) = 𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖
∑ 𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗=1,…𝐾𝐾  
At t=0, all apps have equal probability of gaining a new users. At t=1, the app that ended up gaining the 
arriving users now has higher probability of gaining future users than other apps. This self-reinforcing 
mechanism, known as the preferential attachment model, leads to a power law, as was shown in the context 
of social networks (Barabási and Albert 1999). A simple simulation can illustrate this point.  
We start with K=5 apps, having one user each. At each time, three new users arrive and preferentially choose 
one of the apps based on its current market share: 
Figure 2A-2B: A simulation of power laws through preferential attachment 
 
 
A common way of recognizing a power law is to regress the logarithm of the level of the variable on the rank 
of the observation. Figure 2B illustrates that power laws look like straight lines when represented this way. 
As can be seen from figure 2A, such mechanisms can converge to a very unequal distribution of users (and 
therefore of income), which then persists over time. This is a fundamentally different dynamic than what is 
observed in the industrial economy, and can have a large effect on income distribution2. 
A commonly used power law is the Pareto distribution, with survival function: Pr(𝑋𝑋 > 𝑥𝑥) = (𝑐𝑐
𝑥𝑥
)𝛼𝛼  ∀𝑥𝑥 ∈ (𝑐𝑐, +∞) 
When 𝛼𝛼 decreases, the distribution gets a fatter and fatter tail. When 𝛼𝛼 drops below 2, the variance is infi-
nite. When 𝛼𝛼 drops below one, the mean becomes infinite as well.  
A Simple Mixture Model of Income Distribution 
Considering that software investments have increased over 50% between 2000 and 2012 we now turn to a 
model of an increasingly digitized economy.  
                                                             
2 The large concentration in information goods market has been documented in (Jones and Mendelson 2011) 
  Market Shares Log(Users) / Rank plot at t=1M for 100 apps 
t App #1 App #2 App #3 App #4 App #5 
 
0 20.0% 20.0% 20.0% 20.0% 20.0% 
10 11.4% 11.4% 2.9% 71.4% 2.9% 
100 7.2% 4.3% 0.3% 87.9% 0.3% 
1,000 6.8% 2.4% 0.1% 90.6% 0.0% 
10,000 6.4% 2.8% 0.2% 90.5% 0.1% 
100,000 6.3% 2.8% 0.2% 90.7% 0.1% 
0
2
4
6
8
1 51
Lo
g(
 #
U
se
rs
)
Rank
 Information Technology and the Rise of the Power Law Economy 
 Thirty Sixth International Conference on Information Systems, Fort Worth 2015 7 
 
Figure 3: Software and Computer investment in billions of dollars, 1999-2012. 
 
If, as Marc Andreessen put it, “software is eating the world” (Andreessen 2011), then we can expect that a 
power law will govern an increasing share of the income distribution. This is not only because the IT sector 
will grow, but mostly because IT tends to permeate all sectors. A striking example of this is the recent phe-
nomenon of some teachers becoming millionaires from sharing their educational material online (Singer 
2015). The distributional consequences can be large. For instance, more and more people will be below 
average income, and a smaller number of individuals will have a larger share of the overall income 
(Brynjolfsson et al. 2014).  
Let us consider what happens when individuals optimally choose the economy in which they want to par-
ticipate based on their expected income in each economy. An example could be an accountant who pro-
grams mobile apps on evenings, or a Hollywood waiter who is considering becoming an actor. 
We posit that each person has two potential incomes drawn from two distributions: 
𝑋𝑋𝐿𝐿 ~ 𝐿𝐿𝑜𝑜𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝑜𝑜𝑢𝑢𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝜇𝜇,𝜎𝜎) 
𝑋𝑋𝑃𝑃~𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜(𝑐𝑐,𝛼𝛼) 
Where 𝑋𝑋𝐿𝐿 is the income the individual would have if she took a job in the traditional economy (i.e. if she 
became an accountant or waiter), and 𝑋𝑋𝑃𝑃 is the income she would have if she tried her luck in the power law 
economy (as an actor or app programmer). For simplicity, assume that each individual perfectly observes 
income offers from each option, and then chooses 
𝑌𝑌 = 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑥𝑥(𝑌𝑌𝑃𝑃 ,𝑌𝑌𝐿𝐿). 
Throughout the rest of this paper, we will refer to this model as the “Max model”. Note that there are other 
ways to mix a Pareto distribution and a Log-Normal one, such as using a spliced model, where a lognormal 
distribution is fitted at the bottom and a Pareto at the top under a set of restrictions that guarantee that the 
resulting distribution is continuous and differentiable. Such approaches introduce scaling factors which 
complicate interpretation and do not map into a simple model of income generating processes, which is 
why we do not discuss them in the body of the paper. However, as shown in the appendix, they generate 
findings that are broadly consistent with the ones we derive using the Max model.  
Our theory implies four hypotheses. Using the Max model, we can formally state each of them, and we can 
use our data to test them: 
Hypothesis 1: If superstar effects are an important part of the economy, a model of income distribu-
tions incorporating both log-normal and Pareto distributions should fit the data significantly better 
than a traditional log-normal alone. 
 
If the lognormal variance does capture some dimension of SBTC, then we could expect it to increase over 
time, but much more sharply in early years than in recent years: 
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Hypothesis 2A: Industrial technical change should lead the variance of the underlying lognormal dis-
tribution to significantly increase over time. 
Hypothesis 2B: If industrial technical change is slowing, the observed variance of the log-normal part 
of the income distribution should be stabilizing over time. 
 
Similarly, “software eating the world” can manifest itself in two ways: we might see more and more people 
joining the Pareto economy (hypothesis 3), and we might rewards within the Pareto economy becoming 
more and more unequally distributed (hypothesis 4).  
Hypothesis 3: If more and more people are joining the power law economy, the number of individuals 
whose income seems to be drawn from a Power law may be increasing over time. 
 
Hypothesis 4: If the power law economy is becoming more digital (closer to free, perfect, and instant) 
and more networked, incomes within that economy may become increasingly skewed, resulting in a 
lower Pareto parameter, 𝛼𝛼. 
Data and results 
Relevant Data Sources 
Studying income inequality can usually be achieved using one of two different data sources: 
• Survey data, which may contain a wealth of demographic variables, information on sectors of ac-
tivity and occupation. The main limitation of survey data lies in their poor sampling properties at 
the top: top incomes represent a very small fraction of the population, and are likely to be missed 
by survey sampling. However, these individuals account for a very significant fraction of total in-
come. This is why survey data is generally not used to compute income shares. Furthermore, the 
study of the global shape of the income distribution requires fine-grained data, and would therefore 
not be achievable on survey data. 
• Tax data. Because filing taxes is mandatory above a certain income threshold, federal income tax 
files are very helpful in studying income shares and the income distribution. However, they are 
surrounded by a number of strict confidentiality policies, so that demographic information is poor.  
For the purposes of this paper, we use the second kind of source, tax data. We do this in particular because 
we are interested in studying power laws, and because so much of the action in power laws occurs at the 
very top of the distribution where there are very few observations, tax data provides more suitable infor-
mation. 
We use the IRS Tax Model Files, which are samples of US Federal Individual Income Tax returns between 
1960 and 2008 (except for 1961, 1963 and 1965). The data has been anonymized and blurred out of concern 
for taxpayer's privacy. In particular, the data has very little demographic information, such as job or indus-
try. For example, even state of residence is not available to researchers for all taxpayers whose income ex-
ceeds $200,000. However, its very good sampling properties at the top make it the best dataset to estimate 
income distributions.  
In order to establish the validity of our approach, we first share a few summary statistics about the sampling 
design and argue that it can help us estimate a parametric model of income distribution much better than 
survey data could. Then, using the "wages" variable contained in the data, we provide some summary sta-
tistics about inequality, including top income shares. The following table illustrates the quality of sampling 
for year 1960: 
q0-q50 q50-q80 q80-q90 q90-q95 q95-q99 q99-q99.9 q99.9+ 
n w/n n w/n n w/n n w/n n w/n n w/n n w/n 
45,000 676 17,000 1111 6,000 1035 6,000 514 12,000 210 7,000 81 10,000 6 
Note: n represents the number of observations in each quantile, and w/n the average weight per observation in 
each quantile. A lower value for w/n at the top of the income distribution means better sampling at the top. 
Table 1: Sampling properties of IRS public use tax data 
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As can be seen from table 1, the sampling design of our data seems to lend itself well to a study of top 
incomes: relative to the rest of the population, the top incomes are significantly oversampled. Where, on 
average, a thousand individuals whose labor income falls between the 50th and 80th percentile are grouped 
into one observation, only 6 individuals from the top 0.1% are grouped into one observation. This level of 
precision allows us to work on the shape of the income distribution as a whole, rather than conditional 
averages. 
A first look at income densities 
Let us now have a first look at the shape of the distribution of income. Using Gaussian kernel smoothing as 
in (DiNardo et al. 1996) allows us to graph densities of log incomes for year 1960 and 2008 as follows.  
 
Figure 4: Kernel-Smoothed densities of wage distributions in 1960 and 2008. 
 
 
One can notice that the bulk of both the 1960 and 2008 distributions look roughly log-normal. However, 
they show a very long right tail. Furthermore, the tail appears to have very significantly extended between 
1960 and 2008. Yet this representation may still understate the importance of changes in the tails, because 
they are hard to see. Accordingly, we offer an illustration of fractal effects in income shares. 
Fractal effects in income shares 
Perhaps one of the most compelling ways of illustrating trends in income inequality is to compute “income 
shares.” Income shares tables illustrate the share of all of a specific kind of income that is earned by a given 
percentile of earners. Here and throughout the rest of the paper, we restrict our analysis to wages (as re-
ported to the IRS). This allows us to exclude capital income, which may be subject to different dynamics 
and interfere with our focus on individual productivity. 
In order to give a sense of the widening of income inequality and in order to underline the influence of 
power laws, we offer the following visualization:  
• First, we sum all the reported wages across all individuals and compute the share of these wages 
earned by the top 100%, 10%, 1%, 0.1%, 0.01% and 0.001% of the distribution. 
• We then break these into quarters and show the evolution of their income shares since 1960. 
For example, figure 5B is a decomposition of income shares of the top 10%: Q1 represents the bottom quar-
ter of that group (i.e. individuals between p90 and p92.5), and Q4 represents the top quarter (p97.5 and 
above). The other figures represent the same composition, but of different portions of the population (re-
spectively: all of it, and the top 1%, 0.1%, and so on). 
This visualization has two main advantages. First, it shows that income increases are concentrated at the 
very top of the income distribution. More specifically, it seems that a very significant share of income ine-
quality can be traced back to the top 0.1%. Figure 5C shows that the income share of individuals located in 
$1K $10K $100K $1M $10M $100M
D
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the top quarter of the top 1% (i.e. p99.75 and above) went from about 2.5% in 1960 to almost 8% in 2008. 
About half of that 5.5 point increase can be traced back to the top quarter of the top 0.1% (i.e. p99.975 and 
above): their income share went from .5% to over 3%. 
Second, this visualization shows a “fractal effect”. No matter how far we zoom in, the global picture is ap-
parently the same. As you go up the income distribution, we see that the 1% have their own 1% and so on, 
with a similar (if somewhat noisier) pattern of income distribution. This remarkable scale independence is 
a feature of power laws (also called scale-free distributions).  
 
Note: In 2008, the top 10% starts at an annual wage of $96,000$. The top 1% starts at $260,000. The top 0.1% 
starts at $860,000. The top 0.01% starts at $3.7M. Finally the top 0.001% starts at $15.4M. 
Figures 5A-5F: Income shares fractal patterns, 1960-2008  
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Estimating the Max model  
Having documented the presence and significance of power laws in the U.S. income distribution, let us go 
back to our model where 
𝑌𝑌 = 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑥𝑥(𝑌𝑌𝑃𝑃 ,𝑌𝑌𝐿𝐿). 
The underlying potential incomes, 𝑌𝑌𝑃𝑃 and 𝑌𝑌𝐿𝐿 are fundamendally unobservable to us as econometricians. We 
only observe the mixture Y, and recover the original parameters (𝜇𝜇,𝜎𝜎,𝛼𝛼) through numerical Maximum Like-
lihood Estimation and Goodness of fit estimation (using variations of the Anderson-Darling statistic). Once 
the parameters are recovered, we can simply obtain 𝑄𝑄 =  𝑃𝑃(𝑌𝑌𝑃𝑃  > 𝑋𝑋𝐿𝐿), the proportion of people selecting 
their Pareto draw over their lognormal draw. 
Note that the tax data contains many individuals (roughly around 15%) who report an income of zero, as 
well as many individuals with a very low income. We therefore fit a censored lognormal distribution. For 
simplicity, we give the Pareto and the Lognormal distribution the same support, by fixing c at the 25th per-
centile and then truncating the lognormal distribution at the same value of c. While this model embodies a 
number of simplifications, our results do not seem qualitatively sensitive to different specifications (see 
appendix for the “spliced” model).  
It is straightforward to show that the resulting probability density function of this model is:  e−(𝜇𝜇−log (𝑥𝑥))22𝜎𝜎2 (1 − (𝑥𝑥𝑐𝑐)−𝛼𝛼)
√2𝜋𝜋𝑥𝑥√𝜎𝜎2 + �
𝑥𝑥
𝑐𝑐�
−1−𝛼𝛼
𝛼𝛼(1 − 12Ψ(−𝜇𝜇 − log(𝑥𝑥)√2√𝜎𝜎2 ))
𝑐𝑐
 
Similarly, the resulting cumulative distribution function is: 
(1 − (𝑥𝑥
𝑐𝑐
)−𝛼𝛼)(1 −Ψ(−𝜇𝜇 − Log(𝑥𝑥)√2√𝜎𝜎2 )
Ψ(−𝜇𝜇 − Log(𝑐𝑐)
√2√𝜎𝜎2 )) 
Note that by design we have 0 < 𝑐𝑐 < 𝑥𝑥.  Ψ(. ) is the canonical complementary error function, i.e. 
Ψ(x) = 2
√π
� 𝑛𝑛−𝑡𝑡
2
𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃
∞
𝑥𝑥
 
Maximum likelihood Estimates (MLE) are obtained by numerical optimization (using the PDF above), as 
there is no closed form for them because of the need bottom-truncate the distributions. We fit the model 
using MLE as well as different types of goodness of fit statistics (using the CDF above), including the An-
derson-Darling (AD) statistic as well as ADR and AD2R, which are variants of AD that emphasize fit in the 
right tail (Luceño 2006). These methods yield results that are broadly similar to the ones obtained with 
MLE, but somewhat more dramatic: they identify a lower Pareto 𝛼𝛼 and a higher number of individuals in 
the power law economy. However, the trends they identify over time are the same as the ones obtained 
through MLE. For the sake of clarity, we focus on MLE results for the remainder of this paper. The below 
figures show MLE estimates of the underlying parameters of the Max model: 
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Figure 6: (µ, σ) MLE estimates of the Lognormal/Pareto Mixture based on our model 
 
Note that it is common to report the inverted Pareto coefficient 𝛽𝛽 = 𝛼𝛼
𝛼𝛼−1
 instead of reporting α directly. This 
has two main advantages: first, a higher ß means more inequality, which makes interpretation easier. But 
more importantly, this representation takes into account the fact that α is an exponent, which means that 
small changes in α result in large changes in inequality, and that the impact of a linear decrease in α is 
stronger and stronger as α becomes lower. In particular, as α approaches 2, the variance of a random vari-
able drawn from a Pareto distribution becomes infinite. As α approaches 1, so does its expected value.  
 
 
 
Figure 7: MLE estimates of the Pareto shape (α) and of the percentage of individuals whose 
income is drawn from the Pareto distribution (Q). 
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The estimates of this model seem to recover the qualitative facts discussed earlier: more and more people 
are part of the Pareto distribution, and the Pareto distribution is becoming more and more competitive. 
Therefore, we test our four hypotheses using bootstrap: we resample our data 500 times and estimate the 
model on each sample. This procedure takes about 5 hours using 36 processors. The distribution of the 
parameters we obtain in this way are then used to build confidence intervals and to test our hypotheses.  
Hypothesis 1: The hypothesis that our mixture model fits income data significantly better is tested using 
differences in Bayesian Information Criteria between the lognormal model (null) and the Max model (al-
ternative), reproduced in the table below. The standard deviations of parameter estimates (in parentheses) 
are obtained by bootstrap. 
  Max(P,LN) model Lognormal Only   
year ?̂?𝜇 𝜎𝜎� 𝛼𝛼� 𝑄𝑄�  ?̂?𝜇 𝜎𝜎� Δ𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 
1960 8.42 0.63 (0.005) 13.28 (1.28) 1.79% (0.48%) 8.40 0.65 2028*** 
1962 8.48 0.65 (0.005) 13.74 (1.5) 1.8% (0.51%) 8.46 0.67 2285*** 
1964 8.57 0.67 (0.003) 15.29 (1) 1.62% (0.27%) 8.55 0.68 2583*** 
1966 8.64 0.7 (0.004) 11.15 (0.69) 1.92% (0.44%) 8.62 0.72 2190*** 
1967 8.70 0.69 (0.004) 11.75 (0.72) 2% (0.43%) 8.68 0.71 2451*** 
1968 8.76 0.7 (0.005) 10.77 (0.64) 2.25% (0.46%) 8.74 0.72 2247*** 
1969 8.82 0.71 (0.005) 10.82 (0.74) 2.14% (0.51%) 8.80 0.73 2368*** 
1970 8.93 0.67 (0.005) 10.1 (0.83) 2.32% (0.47%) 8.91 0.69 1735*** 
1971 8.99 0.67 (0.006) 9.77 (0.88) 2.34% (0.55%) 8.96 0.69 1610*** 
1972 9.04 0.68 (0.006) 11.17 (1.42) 2.01% (0.56%) 9.01 0.70 1553*** 
1973 9.08 0.71 (0.008) 12.74 (1.74) 2.37% (0.77%) 9.05 0.73 2445*** 
1975 9.20 0.73 (0.004) 8.9 (0.45) 2.95% (0.41%) 9.16 0.75 1773*** 
1976 9.27 0.73 (0.003) 9.43 (0.34) 3.03% (0.28%) 9.23 0.76 1915*** 
1977 9.33 0.74 (0.003) 8.85 (0.35) 3.1% (0.32%) 9.29 0.77 1796*** 
1978 9.41 0.74 (0.003) 9.27 (0.49) 3.46% (0.34%) 9.36 0.78 1881*** 
1979 9.50 0.73 (0.006) 8.01 (0.71) 3.68% (0.62%) 9.46 0.76 1305*** 
1980 9.57 0.75 (0.002) 8.25 (0.28) 3.5% (0.23%) 9.52 0.78 1470*** 
1981 9.64 0.77 (0.004) 7.63 (0.43) 3.58% (0.44%) 9.60 0.80 1364*** 
1983 9.71 0.81 (0.003) 7.74 (0.3) 3.15% (0.31%) 9.66 0.84 1449*** 
1984 9.76 0.81 (0.003) 7.84 (0.36) 3.27% (0.35%) 9.72 0.85 1464*** 
1985 9.80 0.82 (0.003) 7.35 (0.3) 3.1% (0.29%) 9.76 0.85 1218*** 
1986 9.83 0.84 (0.005) 6.92 (0.44) 3.22% (0.47%) 9.79 0.86 1212*** 
1987 9.83 0.87 (0.003) 7.22 (0.23) 2.73% (0.26%) 9.79 0.89 1337*** 
1988 9.86 0.88 (0.003) 7.48 (0.3) 2.65% (0.32%) 9.82 0.91 1402*** 
1989 9.89 0.89 (0.005) 7.27 (0.49) 2.72% (0.49%) 9.85 0.92 1415*** 
1990 9.93 0.89 (0.004) 7.34 (0.36) 2.71% (0.36%) 9.89 0.92 1345*** 
1991 9.95 0.9 (0.005) 7.04 (0.52) 2.8% (0.51%) 9.91 0.93 1272*** 
1992 9.99 0.9 (0.004) 6.83 (0.32) 3.02% (0.38%) 9.95 0.93 1237*** 
1993 10.03 0.88 (0.004) 6.24 (0.36) 3.23% (0.43%) 9.98 0.91 959*** 
1994 10.07 0.88 (0.003) 6.56 (0.31) 3.32% (0.32%) 10.02 0.91 1047*** 
1995 10.09 0.89 (0.004) 6.54 (0.35) 3.36% (0.42%) 10.04 0.93 1073*** 
1996 10.11 0.9 (0.004) 6.63 (0.29) 3.07% (0.37%) 10.07 0.93 1064*** 
1997 10.16 0.9 (0.003) 6.34 (0.26) 3.45% (0.35%) 10.11 0.93 986*** 
1998 10.21 0.89 (0.004) 6.51 (0.38) 3.47% (0.4%) 10.16 0.92 893*** 
1999 10.24 0.9 (0.004) 6.6 (0.34) 3.3% (0.38%) 10.19 0.94 905*** 
2000 10.28 0.9 (0.006) 6.59 (0.59) 3.46% (0.61%) 10.23 0.94 888*** 
2001 10.32 0.9 (0.003) 6.07 (0.23) 3.59% (0.3%) 10.27 0.93 764*** 
2002 10.34 0.89 (0.003) 6.28 (0.24) 3.5% (0.29%) 10.29 0.92 838*** 
2003 10.35 0.89 (0.003) 6.78 (0.28) 3.33% (0.3%) 10.30 0.93 982*** 
2004 10.38 0.9 (0.003) 6.01 (0.22) 3.58% (0.3%) 10.33 0.93 729*** 
2005 10.40 0.9 (0.005) 6.27 (0.46) 3.52% (0.52%) 10.35 0.94 791*** 
2006 10.42 0.92 (0.004) 6.5 (0.37) 3.17% (0.44%) 10.37 0.96 861*** 
2007 10.44 0.92 (0.003) 5.84 (0.24) 3.56% (0.29%) 10.39 0.96 663*** 
2008 10.46 0.93 (0.003) 6.03 (0.23) 3.55% (0.31%) 10.41 0.97 768*** 
Table 2: MLE estimates of the mixture model and Likelihood Ratio Statistic when com-
pared to the simple lognormal model 
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Using a bootstrap approach, we determine the 0.1% critical value for the Δ𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 statistic for each year. We do 
not use likelihood ratio tests because of the presence of sample weights in the data, which may lead us to 
reject the null too often. We obtain BIC critical values by simulating 10,000 datasets drawn from the null 
distribution, and computing the difference in the BIC of the two models. For year 2008, it is equal to 310. 
The null model is rejected for all years at the 0.1% level, leading us to conclude that the Max model fits the 
data significantly better than a simple lognormal. In other words, focusing on the industrial economy only 
would mean missing an important part of the dynamics of income3.  
Hypothesis 2A (𝜎𝜎 increasing): Increased 𝜎𝜎 (standard deviation of the lognormal distribution underlying 
the industrial economy) is a prediction of skill-biased technical change. Out of 500 bootstrap estimations, 
the intersection of the interval of estimated 𝜎𝜎 for 1960 and the interval of estimated 𝜎𝜎 for 2008 is empty. 
This gives us an estimated p-value under 0.002, and we can conclude with confidence that 𝜎𝜎 has signifi-
cantly increased between 1960 and 2008. 
Hypothesis 2B (regime change in 𝜎𝜎): Figure 6 above illustrates the evolution of the log-normal 𝜎𝜎 over 
time. Visually, the data estimates seem to exhibit a clear break in trends in the 1980s, with the slope of the 
evolution of 𝜎𝜎 declining sharply. More formally, we can test for a structural beak by regressing our estimated 
𝜎𝜎 (from our bootstrap sample of 500 estimates of 𝜎𝜎 per year) on time and performing a Chow test. Testing 
for a structural break in year 1988 yields a very large F-statistic of 1464.38, so we can reject the null that 
there is no trend change in sigma at the 0.1% level. 
Hypothesis 3 (Q increasing): Q represents the number of individuals who select into the power law econ-
omy. Out of 500 bootstrap estimations, the intersection of the interval of estimated q for 1960 and the 
interval of estimated Q for 2008 is empty. This gives us an estimated p-value under 0.002, and we can 
conclude with confidence that 𝑄𝑄 has significantly increased between 1960 and 2008.  
Hypothesis 4 (𝛼𝛼 decreasing): 𝛼𝛼 measures how fat the tail of the Pareto distribution is. A lower 𝛼𝛼 means 
fatter tails and more skewed rewards. Out of 500 bootstrap estimations, the intersection of the interval of 
estimated alphas for 1960 and the interval of estimated alphas for 2008 is empty. This gives us an estimated 
p-value of under 0.002, and we can conclude with confidence that 𝛼𝛼 has significantly decreased between 
1960 and 2008. 
One can note that the increase in Q has slowed in recent years compared to the beginning of the period we 
study. However, rewards are getting more and more skewed within the power-law economy. 
 
Discussion and extensions 
Alternative Theories of Inequality: Using only available data on income distribution, telling different 
stories apart has been a long-standing challenge for the literature. Given the scarcity of data, especially 
regarding our ability to measure IT use at a low level of granularity, identifying the effect of IT using a more 
traditional regression approach remains a challenge. Let us however note that is that institutional and 
SBTC-based explanations of inequality do not predict an increased prevalence of power laws, whereas su-
perstar explanations do. We argue that this fact, when combined with fine grained income data such as the 
IRS public use tax files, can be used to assess various theories using income data and show that observed 
changes are consistent with an increased role of IT.  
 
Robustness checks and sensitivity: When fitting the Max model, we set the lower bound of the trun-
cated lognormal distribution and of the Pareto distribution be the 25th percentile of the wage distribution. 
This allows us to avoid starting the Power Law distribution at or close to zero, as the percentage of tax files 
reporting zero wage income reaches 16% on some years. We used different specifications, such as using an 
                                                             
3 It is worth mentioning that the distribution of income may be even more closely approximated by more 
complex and generalized distributions, such as the double-Pareto-lognormal distribution, or by involving 
Levy or Weibull distributions. We do not do so for the sake of interpretability of the results. 
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absolute value rather than a percentile, or using different levels. We also used more generalized versions of 
the Pareto distribution, such as the Lomax. Such variations alter estimated 𝛼𝛼 and Q coefficients, however 
the direction of changes in coefficients remains the same, and the estimated significance of these changes 
remains very high. Therefore, the main takeaway from this paper is that more and more people are joining 
the power law economy and that this economy is more and more dispersed, keeping in mind that the mag-
nitude of these effects is sensitive to specification. Finally, running models on absolute values of income 
versus well as de-meaned and inflation adjusted income has no impact on the direction of effects, and very 
little effect on magnitudes. Tables reflecting results under these alternative specifications are available from 
the authors upon request. 
 
Extending the analysis to capital income: An in-depth study of capital income is beyond the scope of 
this paper. We present some results using gross income, which includes both wages and capital income in 
the appendix. The results are similar to the ones obtained on wages, although the mechanisms which drive 
the Pareto economy in capital income might be different from the ones which drive the Pareto economy in 
wages. We are showing our Max analysis on gross income as reported to the IRS in Figure 9. The results are 
broadly similar to the ones we obtained for wages only: a more competitive Pareto economy, and more people 
joining it.  
 
 
 
Conclusion 
Our results suggest that as the economy becomes more and more digitized and networked, the income dis-
tribution is changing dramatically. While the idea that increased productivity may benefit everyone in the 
very long term is certainly plausible, in this paper we show that this need not be the case in the short or 
medium term. The key to understanding inequality seems to lie in understanding the underlying market 
mechanisms yielding highly skewed income distributions.  
We find that (1) the distribution of income is better approximated by a model where individuals choose 
optimally between draws from a Pareto distribution (power law economy) and Log-normal distribution 
(industrial economy) than by a Log-normal distribution alone. Using this model, we find that the evolution 
of the shape of the income distribution is consistent with (2) a leveling off of the variance of the underlying 
lognormal distribution in the industrial economy, which is consistent with the hypothesis that skill-biased 
technical change is no longer accelerating as it did earlier in the period; (3) an increased number of indi-
viduals selecting into the power law economy which generates a power law distribution of income, and (4) 
a power law economy delivering increasingly skewed rewards: the winners are winning bigger than ever. 
We find that in recent years, the number of individuals joining the power law economy has stabilized, but 
that competitiveness within that economy has increased. 
More and more people moving into the power law economy does not necessarily mean more and more 
people being better off in absolute terms because of digitization. Indeed, our model accommodates both 
people moving to the power law economy because of increasing opportunity there and people moving be-
cause of decreasing opportunity in the industrial economy. Furthermore, we show that the power law 
economy is producing increasingly unequal rewards. 
If the trends we document in this paper continue, the income distribution will become increasingly 
skewed toward not just the top 1%, but the top 1% of the top 1%. Future research is needed in order to 
more causally distinguish between different types of technologies and their effects on inequality. Further-
more, the effects of digitization on worldwide inequality patterns seems like a worthwhile extension of our 
research.  
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Appendix 
Using a spliced Lognormal-Pareto Specification 
As an alternative to our Max model we also use a “spliced” model of the Pareto/Log-Normal mixture. Spe-
cifically, we model the income distribution with the following PDF: 
𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥) =
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧ β
𝑓𝑓1(𝑥𝑥|𝜇𝜇,𝜎𝜎)
𝐹𝐹1(𝜃𝜃|𝜇𝜇,𝜎𝜎)∀ 𝑥𝑥 ≤ 𝜃𝜃(1 − 𝛽𝛽) 𝑓𝑓2(𝑥𝑥|𝑐𝑐,𝛼𝛼)1 − 𝐹𝐹2(𝜃𝜃|𝑐𝑐,𝛼𝛼) ,∀  𝑥𝑥 > 0 
Were 𝑓𝑓1(𝑥𝑥|𝜇𝜇,𝜎𝜎) is the probability distribution function of a lognormal distribution with parameters 𝜇𝜇 and 
𝜎𝜎, and 𝑓𝑓2(𝑥𝑥|𝑐𝑐,𝛼𝛼)is the p.d.f of a simple, type I Pareto distribution with cutoff c and shape 𝛼𝛼. 𝛽𝛽 is a weighting 
coefficient. Note that this distribution is not in general continuous or differentiable, which may be undesir-
able for modelling purposes, as the empirical income distribution function does not seem to exhibit any 
major discontinuity. However, ensuring continuity is possible by placing restrictions on 𝜇𝜇 and 𝛽𝛽 (Nadarajah 
and Bakar 2012). This requires imposing the following: 
𝜇𝜇 = ln(𝜃𝜃) + 𝜎𝜎2 + 𝜃𝜃𝜎𝜎2𝑓𝑓2′(𝜃𝜃|𝑐𝑐,𝛼𝛼)
𝑓𝑓2(𝜃𝜃|𝑐𝑐,𝛼𝛼)  
𝜙𝜙 = 𝑓𝑓1(𝜃𝜃|𝜇𝜇,𝛼𝛼)(1 − 𝐹𝐹2(𝜃𝜃))
𝑓𝑓2(𝜃𝜃)𝐹𝐹1(𝜃𝜃)  
(with notation change 𝛽𝛽 = 1
1+𝜙𝜙
).  
This setup gives us a continuous and differentiable p.d.f. Note that the likelihood function is not in general 
continuous at 𝜃𝜃, so that MLE is consistent but not necessarily efficient (Bee 2012). MLE estimation (fixing 
c at the 25th percentile) gives the following results:  
 
Figure 8: Estimates of the Spliced Model 
The change in the number of individuals is in the Pareto economy is lower than predicted by the Max model. 
This is expected, since this model equates “being in the Pareto” and “being at the top”, whereas the Max 
model allows for individuals with low income to self-select into the power law economy (because their in-
dustrial income would be lower still). 
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Including Capital Income 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Estimates of the Max Model on Gross Income (including wages and capital in-
come) 
 
Note: in this chart, the truncation cutoffs of the lognormal and the lower cutoff of the Pareto distribution 
are set at 8%. The tax files we study contain much fewer individuals reporting zero gross income than zero 
wages, which allows us to lower the truncation cutoff.   
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